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CASE NOTES
WELFARE LAW-AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND THE
SUBSTITUTE PARENT REGULATION-THE STATE LOSES A
SCAPEGOAT, THE "MAN-IN-THE-HOUSE"
Mrs. Sylvester Smith and her five minor children had been recipients of
public assistance for several years under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program' of the State of Alabama. On October 1, 1966, aid to the
Smith family was terminated on the basis of ineligibility, pursuant to a so-
called "substitute father" regulation.2 A case worker had discovered that a
Mr. Williams visited Mrs. Smith on weekends and had sexual relations with
her. Mr. Williams was not the father of any of the Smith children; he lived
with and supported his wife and nine children. Mr. Williams expressed no
interest in supporting the Smith family, and was in any event financially
incapable of the task. Nevertheless, by reason of his relationship with Mrs.
Smith, the Alabama Welfare Department ruled, pursuant to regulation, that
Mr. Williams was a "substitute father"; thus the Smith family became
ineligible for assistance. Within two and one-half years of its enactment this
regulation eliminated 16,000 children from Alabama's AFDC rolls-a re-
duction of twenty-two per cent.3
A class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief was filed in the
United States District Court. The complaint alleged that the substitute father
regulation was an arbitrary classification which denied assistance to children
who were otherwise eligible, in violation of the Social Security Act of 19354
and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. A three-judge
court held that the regulation deprived needy children of equal protection of
the law and issued a permanent injunction restraining enforcement of the
regulation. 5 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed, solely on the grounds of noncompliance with the Social Security Act,
but not on any constitutional grounds. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
When the King case was decided, thirty-one states and the District of
Columbia had welfare regulations falling within the general classification of
142 U.S.C. §§ 601 el seq. (Supp. III, 1968); ALA. CODE tit. 49, § 17 (1958) (herein-
after referred to as AFDC).
2 ALABAMA PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, Pt. I, Ch. II, Subd. V (A) (1964), as quoted
in Brief for Appellees at 2, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
' King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 315 (1968).
4 §§401 et. seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et. seq. (Supp. III, 1968).
5King v. Smith, 277 F. Supp. 31 (D. Ala. 1967). Federal jurisdiction lies notwith-
standing claimant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the state level. A three
judge court may be convened to hear a constitutional challenge to a state regulation. 42
U.S.C. 1983 (1964); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1383, 2281 (1964). See Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416 (1967).
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"man-in-the-house" rules, including Alabama's substitute father regulation.6
That the instant case rendered over one-half of these state regulations
obsolete demonstrates its broad impact. It is the purpose of this note to set
out the background of the case and explain the bases of the King decision,
to examine the subsisting causes of "man-in-the-house" rules, and finally, to
present the proposition that further litigation will ensue on certain "man-in-
the-house" rules not reached by the King decision.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children is a federally funded assistance
program created by the Social Security Act of 1935.7 This program grants
public assistance to any "needy child . .. who has been deprived of parental
support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with" one of a
listed number of relatives. 8 AFDC programs are operated by the state with
matching funds from the federal government. Within the broad limits of the
Social Security Act, each state has substantial discretion to administer their
AFDC program according to community standards, available resources, the
generosity of state legislators, and so on. Thus, each state may determine the
level of need for eligibility and establish grants at a level it deems sufficient. 9
The broad discretion exercised by state administrators is clearly demon-
strated by the various "man-in-the-house" rules in force prior to the King
decision. These provisions were directed at an ineligible, unrelated adult (i.e.,
a paramour) present in the household of a family under AFDC. For purposes
of general analysis these provisions will be considered in terms of effect and in
terms of the various interpretations of "presence" of a paramour. In the latter
context, state provisions run the gamut of legislative intendment. The Ala-
bama regulation, at one extreme, deemed a man present in the home if he had
sexual relations once a week with the mother in her home or elsewhere.' 0 At
the other extreme, the District of Columbia deemed a man present in the
household if he undertook permanent residence and adopted a "father-role"
towards the children." In terms of their effect, "man-in-the-house" provisions
fall into two categories. The first is the substitute parent regulation which
6 Supra note 2.
7 §§ 401 et. seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et. seq. (Supp. III, 1968).
842 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. III, 1968).
9 This discretion has created substantial disparities in the assistance granted by various
states. For example, the average payment per month to a family under AFDC in 1967
was about $224 in New Jersey, $221 in New York, $53 in Alabama, and $39 in Missis-
sippi. King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 319.
10 See note 13 infra.
11 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AssIsTANCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES,
E.L. 4.5 (IV) (CE) (1965); see also Appendix table 2 to Brief for Appellee, King v.
Smith, supra note 3; Appendices B & C to brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae, King v.
Smith, supra note 3.
[Vol. XVIII
renders the entire family ineligible for aid. The other category alters the level
of need (and hence the level of assistance) by presuming contributions from
the man's income.12
The Alabama substitute father regulation provides a dramatic example of
the operation and effect of "man-in-the-house" provisions. According to the
Alabama regulation, an able-bodied man is deemed a substitute parent if he
regularly or frequently has sexual relations with an AFDC mother in her
home or elsewhere.' The AFDC program specifically provides that only a
needy child deprived of parental support is eligible for aid.14 Therefore any
family within the Alabama regulation was ineligible by reason of the presence
of two "parents," notwithstanding matters of need or the lack of actual
contributions from the substitute parent.
While disclaiming all moral judgments relating to sexual behavior, attor-
neys for the State of Alabama offered several practical arguments in defense
of this regulation. First, the substitute parent represents a resource for sup-
port of the family. The regulation induces a man to assume the responsibil-
ities of family life. This results in savings to the welfare department and
permits eligible families to receive larger proportions of limited welfare
funds. 15
Second, the State has a legitimate interest in promoting stable marital re-
lationships, and conversely, an interest in restraining illicit relationships.
Since families whose parents are legally married are ineligible for AFDC re-
gardless of need, it was argued that aid to families with illicit relationships
would discriminate against legal relationships. Thus, the substitute parent
regulation refuses a monetary advantage to people in an illicit relationship
with the dual effect of removing a deterrent to marriage and adding a deter-
rent to the production of illegitimate children. :'6
12 Brief for Appellee, supra note 11.
13 ALABAMA PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 2, provides:
"V. Child ineligible if there is a father or mother substitute.
A. Father substitute: An able-bodied man, married or single, is considered a substitute
father of all the children of the applicant/recipient mother living in her home, whether
they are his or not, if: (1) he lives in the home with the child's natural or adoptive
mother for the purpose of cohabitation; or (2) though not living in the home regularly,
he visits frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with the child's natural or adoptive
mother; or (3) he does not frequent the home but cohabits with the child's natural or
adoptive mother elsewhere. Pregnancy or a baby six months or under is prima facie
evidence of a substitute father as indicated above." (Commissioner King testified that
regular or frequent visits for cohabitation means at least one visit per week. Appendix to
Briefs of Appellee and Appellant, at 84-85, King v. Smith, supra note 3.)
1442 U.S.C. § 602(b) (Supp. III, 1968). AFDC-UP provides for assistance to families
in which both parents are present. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. 111, 1968). This is a voluntary
program and only twenty-one states participate. Alabama is not a participant.
15 Brief for Appellant at 45-47, King v. Smith, supra note 3.
la"Id. at 11, 14-15.
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Finally, it was argued that the substitute parent regulation provides de-
tailed procedural safeguards to prevent abuse. A person may request a hearing
to challenge the application of the regulation, and a recipient may be rein-
stated upon providing proof that the relationship had ceased. Termination of
aid could be stayed up to sixty days to allow the recipient time to present
evidence.1
7
In King, Chief Justice Warren affirmed the State's interest in discouraging
illicit relationships and in efficiently allocating its welfare funds; yet he held
that such interests cannot justify disqualification for AFDC benefits.' s This
decision turned on a statutory definition of "parent" which the Chief Justice
derived from a number of sources. First, the legislative history of the Social
Security Act indicates that the drafters intended ADC assistance for families
which were deprived of a "breadwinner.' 9 This special category was devised
because other forms of assistance, such as unemployment compensation,
were not available to fatherless families. In addition, the term "parent"
throughout Title IV denotes legal support. For example, one provision re-
quires state officials to report a parent who deserts his family to the appro-
priate law enforcement officials. 20 Finally, official HEW policy supports this
latter definition. For example, the Handbook on Public Assistance Adminis-
tration provides that a stepparent not required by state law to support a child
need not be considered the child's parent.2 ' Therefore, the Court held the
Alabama substitute father regulation invalid because it defines parent in a
manner inconsistent with the Social Security Act.
A second basis of the Court's decision lay in the rehabilitative, in contrast
to punitive, thrust of recent welfare legislation. The Chief Justice observed
that the morality of behavior of welfare recipients had in the past been
relevant in determining eligibility for public aid.2 2 However, such punitive
17 Id. at 427-29.
18 King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 320.
19 King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 320 n.17.
2042 U.S.C. § 402(a)(11) (Supp. III, 1968).
21King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 331; HANDBOOKC OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINIS-
TRATION, Pt. IV, § 3412 (4) (1967) (hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK). This conclusion
is not entirely correct. In fact, for years HEW refused to apply a clear, consistent
definition of "parent" to state plans. Thus at least two states had substitute parent
regulations substantially similar to the Alabama regulation that had been approved by
HEW. MICHIGAN MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, Pt. B, Item 259(2) (1955), as
quoted in Appendix to Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae, at 27a, King v. Smith,
supra note 3; NEw MExico DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL 221, 722 (1964),
as quoted in Appendix to Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae, at 32a, King v. Smith,
supra note 3. For this reason Justice Douglas argued that the case must be decided on
constitutional grounds. King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 334-38 (Douglas, J., concurring
opinion).
22 King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 320-22.
[Vol. XVIII
CASE NOTES
measures are obsolete in view of HEW policy and recent amendments to the
Social Security Act. A most dramatic example of an assertion of rehabilitative
goals is the Fleming Ruling and the companion legislation that resulted from
the Louisiana "suitable home" rule of 1960.23 The Fleming Ruling and sub-
sequent amendments to the Social Security Act led the Chief Justice to con-
clude that the protection of children is the paramount goal of AFDC.24
Thus, it is "simply inconceivable . .. that Alabama is free to discourage
immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute disqualification of
needy children. 2 5
The Court's conclusion that the substitute father regulation is contrary to
both HEW policy and the Social Security Act of 1935 was succinctly stated:
"destitute children who are legally fatherless cannot be flatly denied federally
funded assistance on the transparent fiction that they have a substitute
parent." 26 Given this judicial pronouncement, two questions deserve consider-
ation: first, how and why did "man-in-the-house" rules come about origi-
nally; and second, what will become of "man-in-the-house" rules not reached
by the King decision?
The etiology of "man-in-the-house" rules lies in the moral judgments
relating to sexual and social behavior that permeate all levels of welfare
administration. The philosophy of public aid for "worthy persons only" is
well documented in the history of welfare in this century.27 A classic early
example is the widow's pension program. Legislators, administrators, and
case workers structured and operated the programs in a manner which
ensured that only "morally fit" widows would receive aid. In Michigan, where
unwed mothers were legally eligible for assistance, a 1934 study indicated
that only twenty-five unwed mothers out of a total case load of 2,000 families
were receiving aid.2 8
Congressmen who drafted the Social Security Act also articulated a crite-
23 The rule stated that families in an unsuitable home would be ineligible for aid. The
birth of an illegitimate child rendered the home unsuitable. Within a few months of its
enactment the suitable home rule eliminated 23,000 children from Louisiana's welfare
rolls. BELL, Am TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN, 137-151 (1965). Then Secretary of HEW
Fleming issued a statement declaring that "a state plan ...may not impose an eligibility
condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on the basis that the
home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable. .. ." State Letter No. 452,
Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (1961).
24 King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 325.
25 King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 326.
26 King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 334.
27 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 23, 1-75; LEYENDECKER, PROBLEvS AND POLICY IN PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE 45-57 (1955); Wedemyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 326, 328-29 (1966).
28 BELL, supra note 23, at 9.
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rion of "correct" moral behavior. 29 The use of "suitable home" policies for
twenty-five years demonstrates that state officials clearly recognized moral
sanctions implicit in the legislation. Furthermore, HEW policy officially sanc-
tioned "suitable home" policies until 1945, and not until 1961 were such
policies vigorously reversed. 0 Thus, the criteria of moral behavior have
pervaded all levels of welfare administration in the past. Legislation expand-
ing family services3'1 and HEW policies such as the Fleming Ruling32' indicate
that the relevance of punitive morality is diminishing. However, the instant
case clearly demonstrates that such moral considerations are not yet extin-
guished.
Although Alabama disclaimed the existence of moral sanctions in the
substitute father regulation, their arguments in its defense are pregnant with
moral implications. For example, Commissioner King of the Alabama Depart-
ment of Pensions and Security testified that he did not think the State should be
in a position of subsidizing relationships falling within the substitute father
regulation. 3A An argument presented to the Court asserted that the Alabama
regulation would reduce the AFDC caseload and permit a higher proportion
of aid to families that remained eligible.14 The subtle thrust of this argument
is the implication that "good" families are more deserving than "bad"
families.
In addition to the problem of punitive morality, "man-in-the-house" rules
came into existence because of the failure of HEW to effectively enforce
conformance with federal standards. The Secretary of HEW is charged by
law with the responsibility of reviewing state plans to ensure conformity
with federal policy and the constitutional rights of recipients.3 5 However,
objectionable policies have been approved, 36 and others, though disapproved,
remained in force.3 7 There are several explanations for this situation. First,
2 H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 36 (1935).
30 Supra note 23.
31 BELL, supra note 23, 61-75; LEYENDECER, supra note 27, 82-111.
3 2 Supra note 23.
I' Appendix to Briefs of Appellee and Appellant at 711, King v. Smith, supra note 3.
34 Brief for Appellant at 15, King v. Smith, supra note 3.
9542 U.S.C. § 602(b) (Supp. III, 1968). HANDBOOK Pt. IV, § 2200(a) states:
"The policies and procedures for taking applications and determining eligibility for assis-
tance or other services will be consistent with program objectives; will respect the rights
of individuals under the United States Constitution, the Social Security Act, Title IV
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and all other relevant provisions of Federal and State
laws; and will not result in practices that violate the individual's privacy or personal
dignity, or harass him, or violate his constitutional rights."
36 A Michigan regulation similar to the Alabama substitute parent provision was
approved by HEW in 1963. BELL, supra note 23, at 113.
87 HEW officials vigorously objected that the Alabama regulation did not conform to fed-
eral policy, yet Commissioner King enacted the regulation and it remained in force until
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HEW does not always clearly define its own policies. This is best demon-
strated by the King case which really developed from the fact that for years
HEW had offered no clear definition of "parent." Thus, a number of states
adopted varying interpretations, some approved, some disapproved. Second,
HEW lacks effective procedures and sanctions to enforce conformity of state
plans to federal policy. When the Secretary determines that a state plan is
objectionable, a formal conformity hearing must be called in Washington.
This is a cumbersome process and only sixteen hearings occurred between
1936 and 1961.88 Furthermore, the only real sanction against a recalcitrant
state is the withdrawal of federal funds from the category of assistance con-
taining the offensive regulation. Federal funds constitute the bulk of state
welfare grants, so this action would virtually eliminate assistance in a given
category. This is indeed a drastic step, which has been applied only once in
the history of the Social Security Administration. 9
These two factors, punitive morality and inefficient federal supervision,
are, to a large extent, responsible for a wealth of arbitrary and discrimina-
tory administrative devices.40 The King case has voided one of these devices-
the substitute parent regulation. However, certain "man-in-the-house" rules
not reached by the King decision remain in force. Therefore, there is a dis-
tinct possibility of future litigation dealing with residual "man-in-the-house"
rules. This possibility is diminished to the extent that the developing public
consciousness of welfare problems and the concomitant expansion of rehabil-
itative programs reduce punitive morality considerations, and also to the
extent that HEW effectively and consistently ensures conformity to federal
policy and the constitutional rights of recipients. However, the situation past
and present invites skepticism that further litigation will be avoided.
As discussed above, "man-in-the-house" rules fall into two distinct cate-
gories: the substitute parent regulation, which defines a paramour as a
"parent," rendering the entire family ineligible for aid; the second category,
which does not affect eligibility, but presumes contributions to the family
from the man's income, thus lowering the amount of government assistance.
The King case ruled only that aid may not be denied on the "transparent
fiction" that the paramour is a parent.4 1 The question that remains unre-
a federal injunction issued about two and one-half years later. King v. Smith, supra
note 3, at 326 n. 23.
38 BELL, supra note 23, at 223 n. 33.
39 Hearing on H.R. 10032 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (1962).
40 See, e.g., Anderson v. Burson, No. 10443 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (employable mother
regulation) ; Northway v. Carter C.A., No. 67 C 292 (D. Mo. 1967) (residence require-
ment); Williams v. Gandy, No. G.C. 6728 (N.D. Miss. 1967) (hearings after termina-
tion); Collins v. State Board of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957)
(maximum benefits).
41 King v. Smith, supra note 3, at 334.
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solved by case law is the extent to which states may use "man-in-the-house"
rules to presume contributions to the support of needy families.
The policies of three states may serve to demonstrate the variations of
such a regulation. A recent revision of Indiana policy states that an "unre-
lated adult person of the opposite sex . . . shall be responsible for . . . one
share of shelter."41 2 This seems to be the most permissive policy imaginable;
to require less from a nonrecipient would, in effect, make that person a direct
recipient of benefits going to the entire household. Illinois applies a some-
what more restrictive policy. In Illinois, a person standing in loco parentis
must pay one hundred per cent of the rent.43 Rent payments are excluded
from the budget of eligible children unless the man is unable to pay. In New
Jersey, on the other hand, the entire income of a man in the household is
computed in determining the family's needs. 44 The child remains eligible for
aid, but the amount of the grant is reduced to the extent that the presump-
tion of income reduces need. This income is presumed to be an available re-
source to the family whether or not it is in fact made available to the
family.
The Indiana and Illinois policies may be justified as essentially budgeting
arrangements and not conclusive presumptions of contributions. The New
Jersey policy, however, is objectionable on two grounds: it is contrary to
HEW policy, and it violates the constitutional rights of recipients.
Title IV of the Social Security Act provides that state agencies "shall, in
determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources"
available to recipients. 45 It is important to distinguish contributions actually
made to a needy family from a presumption of contributions derived from a
non-legal relationship. HEW policy permits only the former:
The State plan must provide that only income and resources that are, in fact,
available to an applicant or recipient for current use on a regular basis will be
taken into consideration in determining need and amount of payments.40
A recent policy statement is even more explicit: "the presence in the home
... of a 'man-in-the-house' is not an acceptable basis for finding of ineligibil-
42 Letter of A. Kelly, Director, Indiana Department of Public Welfare (Sept. 27, 1968),
on file at Assistance Payments Administration, Social and Rehabilitative Service, Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare in Chicago, Illinois.
43 ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID MANUAL, Ch. 1250 (1967); ILLINOIS DEPART-
MENT OF PUBLIC AID, OFFICIAL BULLETIN No. 67.37 (1967).
44 DIvIsioN OF PUBLIC WELFARE, NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES,
CATEGORICAL ASSISTANCE BUDGET MANUAL, § 501.6(e) (1967), as cited in Graham, Civil
Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 836, 905 n.232 (1968).
45§ 402(a) (7), 42 U.S.C § 602(a)(7) (Supp. III, 1968).
4 0 HANDBOOK, supra note 21, Pt. IV, § 3131(7) (1967) (emphasis added).
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ity or for assuming the availability of income." '47 Therefore, the New Jersey
policy which conclusively presumes the availability of the entire income of
a man is contrary to HEW policy and the Social Security Act.
There are a number of constitutional arguments on which New Jersey's
type of policy could be challenged in federal courts. 48 The proposition that
public aid is a right, the refusal of which is a denial of due process of law,
has gained prominence in legal writings. 49 However, judges generally give this
proposition short shrift; there is as yet no constitutional right to receive
public aid.50
A stronger argument seems to be the proposition that a "man-in-the-house"
rule which presumes a contribution before the fact is an arbitrary classifica-
tion of need which denies a recipient the equal protection of the law. The
basic requirement that state regulations affect like people in like circum-
stances is set out in Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis:
It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a
statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that in all cases it must appear not only that a classification has been made, but
also that it is one based upon some reasonable ground-some difference which
bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification-and is not a mere
arbitrary selection. 51
The New Jersey "man-in-the-house" rule is an arbitrary classification scheme
to the extent that a family's needs are presumed to be met by contributions
which may, in fact, not occur.
Although the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to apply the equal
protection clause to protect economic interests 5 2 this should not be an
obstacle to a decision against the New Jersey policy. The Court is "extremely
sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights. . . ."53 For example, although
there is no absolute right to vote, the Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections voided Virginia's poll tax on equal protection grounds.54 The poll
47 See 45 C.F.R. § 302.1(b) (1968).
48Where an action is brought without exhausting state remedies, a substantial con-
stitutional question is a requisite for federal jurisdiction, supra note 5.
49 E.g., Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. REv.
210 (1967); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
50 E.g., Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1967); but see Snell v.
Wyman, C.A. 67-2676 (S.D. N.Y. 1968) (Kauffmann, J., dissenting opinion).
51 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897).
52 Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
53Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
54383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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tax was held to have infringed a "right" that is "fundamental" in nature.50
If the "right" to vote is "fundamental" certainly the "right" to receive at
least minimal subsistence through public aid should also be "fundamental"
and within the purview of the equal protection clause.
The Court's willingness to allow "any" reasonable set of facts to support
a classification5 6 should not effectively rebut an equal protection argument
against the New Jersey policy. First, the New Jersey policy bears no rea-
sonable relation to the goals of AFDC. In the King case, Chief Justice
Warren observed that the protection of children is the paramount goal of
AFDC.5 7 He concluded:
Children who are told, as Alabama has told these appellees, to look for their food
to a man who is not in the least obliged to support them are without meaningful
protection. Such an interpretation of congressional intent would be most unreason-
able, and we decline to adopt it.58
The New Jersey policy is equally unreasonable because it may deny aid to a
child by presuming contributions which he in fact does not receive.
Although many men living with AFDC families may in actuality make
substantial contributions from their income, this does not provide a reason-
able basis for the New Jersey policy. The New Jersey rule states that the
income of the man "shall be deemed available." 59 This indicates that only
the relationship is rebuttable; the presumption of contributions from the
entire income is conclusive. This is certainly discriminatory against children
who may receive no contributions, yet receive less aid than other children
in equal need. Thus, the New Jersey policy operates to deprive eligible chil-
dren of equal protection of the law.
All "man-in-the-house" rules which presume contributions or in other ways
discriminate against recipients ought to be -abolished; if they are not re-
scinded there will be a sequel to the King case. Increasing activity of legal
aid services indicates that objectionable policies will not be tolerated as in
the past.' 0 In a broad context, then, the King case is but one stage in the
development of case law defining-and refining-the rights of welfare re-
cipients.
Michael O'Connor
- Id. at 667.
56 Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935).
57 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968).
58 Id., at 330.
59 DivsioN or PUBLIC WELFARE, NEw JERSEY DEPT. OF INSTITUTIONS & AGENCIES,
CATEGORICAL ASSISTANCE BUDGET MANUAL § 501.6(e).
60 Supra note 39.
